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I argue that a dilemma arises for naturalistic philosophers of mind in the naturalised seman-
tics tradition. Giving a naturalistic account of the mind is a pressing problem. Brentano’s 
Thesis — that a state is mental if, and only if, that state has underived representational 
content — provides an attractive route to naturalising the mental. If true, Brentano’s Thesis 
means that naturalising representation is sufficient for naturalising the mental. But a natu-
ralist who accepts Brentano’s Thesis thus commits to an eliminativism about the category 
of the mental. This is because naturalistic theories of representation are reductive, and so 
over-generalise by applying to patently non-mental states. According to these theories, it 
has been argued, phenomena like tree rings and saliva come out as representational. Only 
proposing further Naturalistic conditions on representation could avoid the eliminativist 
conclusion. But this shows that Naturalists have made only limited progress towards nat-
uralising the mental. And if a Naturalist rejects Brentano’s Thesis, then she gives up on a 
clear link between representation and mentality. Hence, it is incumbent on the Naturalist 
to propose another, naturalistically acceptable, mark of the mental. This, again, shows that 
Naturalists have made only limited progress on the issue of naturalising the mental.
Keywords: Intentionality, representation, physicalism, eliminativism, Brentano, materialism, 
naturalism.
RESUMO
 Eu argumento que surge um dilema para os filósofos naturalistas da mente na tradição 
semântica naturalizada e, assim, dar uma explicação naturalista da mente é uma questão 
urgente. A Tese de Brentano - de que um estado é mental se, e somente se, esse estado 
tem conteúdo representacional não derivado - fornece uma rota atraente para naturalizar 
o mental. Se for verdadeira, a Tese de Brentano significa que naturalizar a representação 
é suficiente para naturalizar o mental. Mas um naturalista que aceita a Tese de Brentano 
compromete-se, portanto, com um eliminativismo sobre a categoria do mental. Isso ocor-
re porque as teorias naturalistas da representação são redutivas e, portanto, generalizam 
excessivamente, aplicando-se a estados patentemente não mentais. De acordo com essas 
teorias, argumentou-se, fenômenos como anéis de árvores e saliva contam como repre-
sentacionais. Somente a proposta de outras condições naturalistas sobre a representação 
poderia evitar a conclusão eliminativista. Mas isso mostra que os naturalistas fizeram ape-1 University of Connecticut, 
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Introduction
An enduring problem in analytic philosophy of mind 
is how to locate the mental in the natural world. How are 
we to do full justice to, for example, phenomenal con-
sciousness or the intentionality of thought within the con-
fines of a materialist ontology? It has seemed that reducing 
mental facts to physical facts is the surest way to avoid the 
spectre of Cartesian Dualism.2 But reductive materialism 
about the mental faces charges of being inadequate to the 
phenomena.3 Although significant work has been devoted 
to how phenomenal consciousness might be accommodat-
ed in a materialist account of the mental, it has recently 
been suggested that naturalising intentionality presents an 
even more difficult problem for materialism (Lycan, 2009, 
p. 553). In this paper I will argue that reductive naturalists 
attempting to naturalise the mental via naturalising inten-
tionality encounter a dilemma. 
Franz Brentano proposed that intentionality was 
the mark of the mental. This has since become known as 
Brentano’s Thesis. In contemporary analytic philosophy 
of mind, Brentano’s Thesis is commonly understood as 
offering necessary and sufficient conditions on mentality: 
a state is mental if, and only if, that state has underived 
representational content (Textor, 2019, p. 56). Brentano’s 
Thesis is attractive because it promises to provide a way to 
separate the mental from the non-mental, and thus offers 
a clear path to naturalising the mental. In the form just 
stated, Brentano’s Thesis implies that if representation is 
naturalised, then the intimidating task of naturalising the 
mental is complete. But, I will argue, a dilemma seems to 
present itself to the reductive naturalist at this point. If 
she accepts Brentano’s Thesis then, I will argue, the nat-
uralist ends up embracing eliminative materialism. If she 
rejects Brentano’s Thesis, then, in having naturalised rep-
resentation alone, she has made only limited progress on 
naturalising the mental. This is not a fatal dilemma, but it 
does suggest that naturalistic work on mental representa-
tion has made less progress on the issue of naturalising the 
mental than may be generally thought.
In Section 1 I clarify Brentano’s Thesis and show how 
reductive naturalists of the kind I am interest ed in general-
ly understand it. In Section 2 I sketch the broad naturalistic 
approach that I will focus on: the naturalised semantics tradi-
tion. Then I will explain the problem such naturalists face in 
naturalising intentionality and how they typically approach 
this task. In Section 3 I state the dilemma and explain how 
naturalists risk committing to eliminativism about the cat-
egory of the mental if they adopt Brentano’s Thesis as it is 
commonly formulated. That is the first horn of the dilemma. 
The other horn rejects Brentano’s Thesis, but this then sug-
gests that naturalists have made only limited progress towards 
naturalising the mental. In Section 4 I consider ways the nat-
uralist might respond to the dilemma. In Section 5 I sketch 
some possible directions forward.
Before I begin, I should make some clarifications. I shall 
be assuming a representational theory of mind without de-
fence — as do all the naturalists I consider here. That is, I 
will assume that intentional mental states come to be about 
things because they stand in relation to mental representa-
tions.4 Also, it is commonplace to distinguish two questions 
regarding mental representations. What makes a certain state 
a representational state? And: in virtue of what does a partic-
ular representational state come to represent what it does?5
Some theorists propose to answer both questions within the 
same framework (e.g. Millikan, 1984), while others advocate 
offering separate theories for each (e.g. Ramsey, 2007 and 
Fodor, 1990). I will sp eak generally of naturalistic theories of 
representation, and will not complicate matters by explaining 
a given theorist’s stance on these issues. I do not think this 
affects my overall point.
1
The first step towards naturalising the mental is to clear-
ly separate the mental from the non-mental. Franz Brentano 
proposed a way to do just that. In Psychology from an Empiri-
cal Standpoint he wrote: 
Every mental phenomenon is character-
ized by… the intentional (or mental) inexis-
nas um progresso limitado no sentido de naturalizar o mental. E se um naturalista rejeita a tese de Brentano, então ele 
abandona uma ligação clara entre representação e mentalidade. Consequentemente, cabe ao naturalista propor uma 
outra marca do mental, naturalisticamente aceitável. Isso, mais uma vez, mostra que os naturalistas fizeram apenas um 
progresso limitado na questão da naturalização do mental. 
Palavras-chave: Intencionalidade, representação, fisicalismo, eliminativismo, Brentano, materialismo, naturalismo.
2 For doubts about the viability of non-reductive physicalism see e.g. Schneider (2012).
3 See, e.g. Chalmers (1996) for an argument that materialism is threatened by an ‘explanatory gap’ in how consciousness could depend 
on the non-conscious. See also Lycan (2009), Kriegel (2013) and Pautz (2013) for criticisms of reductive approaches to intentionality.
4 See, e.g. Fodor, 1990, p. 16. See also Egan (2014) who glosses representationalism about the mind as “(…) the view that the human 
mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities” (2014, p. 115).
5 See, in particular, Ramsey (2007) for further discussion.
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tence of an object, and what we might call, 
though not wholly unambiguously, refer-
ence to a content, direction toward an ob-
ject (which is not to be understood here as 
meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity… 
This intentional inexistence is characteristic 
exclusively of mental phenomena. No phys-
ical phenomenon exhibits anything like it 
(1995, p. 88-89). 
Brentano here seems to be pointing out some puzzling 
asp ects of mental states (to put things in contemporary 
terms), and suggesting that these asp ects are common to all 
and only mental states. In contemporary philosophy the re-
marks above are almost universally taken to commit Brenta-
no to Brentano’s Thesis: intentionality is the (distinctive and 
exclusive) mark of the mental. In other words,  Brentano gives 
necessary and sufficient conditions for some states’s being a 
mental state. It is also broadly agreed that ‘intentionality’ is 
the property something has of being about something other 
than itself. This aboutness has come to be understood as rep-
resentation: a mental state like a perception of a red trian-
gle can be said to be about the triangle because it possesses a 
certain representational content. A state is intentional just in 
case that state has representational content. 
It is not a trivial matter to proceed from Brentano’s origi-
nal remarks on ‘intentional inexistence’ to identifying intentional 
states with those that have representational content. Proper at-
tention to this may, however, provide the naturalist with a way 
out of the dilemma I will set up. So it is worth briefly unpacking 
how a naturalist might come to this commitment. 
Ruth Millikan (2000) offers one path from Brentano’s 
remarks to the thought that all intentional states are states 
with representational content. Millikan begins by noting how 
Brentano “equated intentionality with the capacity to bear a 
real relation to something nonexistent” (Millikan, 2000, p. 
83) And she claims that Brentano was “surely mistaken” in 
thinking that this marks only the mental. She says that pur-
poses are also capable of going unfulfilled, and hence can 
stand in relation to something nonexistent. And this suggests, 
she thinks, that focusing on natural purposes can provide a 
route to naturalising the phenomenon Brentano seeks to 
capture by pointing to this peculiar relation to nonexistent 
things. But, she notes, many systems do have natural purposes 
and yet fail to be about anything. The purpose of a stomach is 
to digest food, but stomachs are not about anything: 
One thing that the example of natural 
purposes shows is that although being 
subject to Brentano’s relation may be 
necessary to intentionality, if we take in-
tentionality to imply aboutness it is not 
sufficient. Aboutness is associated with a 
purpose only when the purpose is explic-
itly represented. On the other hand, for 
there to be an explicit representation of a 
purpose, there must first be a purpose to 
represent. The naturalist challenge here 
is to show, first, that the phenomenon of 
natural purposiveness can fulfill this sec-
ond requirement, that a natural purpose 
may, equally naturally, be a represented 
purpose. Second, it needs to show how 
the same kind of analysis can be used also 
to naturalize intentionality in cases where 
facts are represented rather than purpos-
es or ends. It must be shown, for example, 
how this way of naturalizing Brentano’s 
relation can apply to the intentionality of 
beliefs, and of sentences that state facts. 
It needs to be shown in every case that 
what creates the appearance of Brenta-
no’s relation is merely an underlying natu-
ral purpose (Millikan, 2000, p. 84).
Millikan gives a detailed account of representation in 
terms of ‘proper function’ in Language, Thought and Other 
Biological Categories, thus claiming to fulfil her ‘second re-
quirement’ that a natural purpose be a represented purpose 
(1984). This is one way to reason from Brentano’s remarks to 
the view that intentionality just is representation. I will sim-
ply assume that intentionality is representation for now (as 
the naturalists I consider here do), and return later to ques-
tion the assumption. Hence, a first pass at stating Brentano’s 
Thesis (BT) more precisely is this:
(BT) A state, S, is mental if, and only if, S has represen-
tational content.
(BT) is supposed to provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions on mentality. All and only states with representa-
tional content are mental states. But, as is well known, there 
are obvious counterexamples to (BT). Sentences, maps and 
pictures are all representations yet surely do not count as 
mental states. These counterexamples appear to show that a 
state’s having representational content is not sufficient for it 
to be mental. As a result, it is common to qualify (BT) by 
restricting it to ‘underived’ representational content. I will 
follow Neander (2017) in defining ‘state with derived (inten-
tional/representational) content’ as a state with intentional 
content derived from some source of independently exist-
ing intentionality. Maps, sentences, and other artefacts de-
rive their aboutness, it is commonly supposed, from human 
mental states with preexisting aboutness that either “is not 
derived from anything or it is derived from the nonintention-
al facts and properties of the world” (Neander, 2017, p. 9). 
Applying this qualification gives us the following version of 
Brentano’s Thesis:
(bt*) A state, S, is mental if, and only if, S has underived 
representational content.
In this form, Brentano’s Thesis is attract ive because it 
Michael J. Hegarty
62Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 22(1):59-68, jan/apr 2021 
seems to provide necessary and sufficient conditions on men-
tality.6 It is common, but not universal, for philosophers to 
adopt (bt*) (See e. g. Dretske, 1995 and Lycan, 2008, p. 234) 
(bt*) forges a link between representation and mental-
ity, and thus promises a path towards naturalising the mind. 
If (bt*) is true, then naturalising representation would suffice 
for naturalising the mental. In the next section I will explain 
how the kind of naturalist I am considering here seeks to 
naturalise representation. This naturalist belongs to what is 
known as the ‘naturalised semantics’ tradition.
2
The naturalised semantics tradition begins with the view 
that representations have semantic and intentional properties 
that are essential to explaining how a representation is about 
its represented object. There is no well-defined single notion 
of naturalism (Neander, 2017, p. 3) But it is enough for my 
purposes to note that naturalists in the naturalised semantics 
tradition support a materialist ontology and hold that natu-
ralistically acceptable theories and explanations appeal only 
to concepts and frameworks that are acceptable to our best 
scientific theories.7 Given the strictures of this naturalism, it 
is far from obvious how to locate the apparent semantic and 
intentional properties of representations in the natural order. 
Jerry Fodor (1984) gave what has become the canonical state-
ment of the issue: 
The worry about representation is… that 
the semantic/intentional properties of 
things will fail to supervene upon their phys-
ical properties. What is required to relieve 
the worry is therefore, at a minimum, the 
framing of naturalistic conditions for repre-
sentation. […] [W]hat we want at a minimum 
is something of the form ‘R represents S’ 
is true iff C where the vocabulary in which 
condition C is couched contains neither in-
tentional nor semantical expressions (1984, 
p. 232).
In response to this challenge, philosophers in the natu-
ralised semantics tradition sought to give conditions under 
which some state could be a representation in terms featuring 
no unreduced semantic, intentional, or psychological notions. 
Of course, much hangs on what we mean by ‘concepts and 
frameworks that are acceptable to our best scientific theories’. 
Typically, Naturalists have relied on notions culled from the 
physical and biological sciences to naturalise representation. 
Dretske (1981; 1986; 1988; 1995) relies on the notions of in-
dicator function and information. Fodor (1987; 1990) gives 
a purely causal theory of content. Millikan (1984; 1989) ex-
plains representation in terms of historically normal proper 
function by drawing on natural selection. It is now commonly 
held that these naturalists attempt to give reductive expla-
nations of representation (Burge 2010; Pautz 2013; Kriegel 
2013; Morgan 2018). Henceforth, I will use ‘Naturalist’ and 
‘Naturalism’ as labels to refer to this reductive project of nat-
uralising representation and its pract itioners. Naturalists thus 
endorse Fodor’s slogan that “If aboutness is real, it must be 
really something else” (1987, p. 97)
My question is: Can a Naturalist about the mind accept 
Brentano’s Thesis? Naturalists understand Brentano’s Thesis 
as (bt*). I have already mentioned how (bt*) is attract ive be-
cause, if it is true, it appears to make the Naturalist’s project to 
naturalise the mind clear and tract able. However, in the next 
section I explain how this project produces a dilemma for the 
Naturalist. There are difficulties for the Naturalist both if 
they do accept (bt*) and if they reject it. 
3
The dilemma arises because Naturalist theories of repre-
sentation (as is well-known) result in giving representational 
status to all manner of patently non-mental phenomena. For 
example, Allen and Hauser (1992) complain that Millikan’s 
theory attributes representational content to certain inter-
act ions between acacia trees. Further, Kim Sterelny (1995) 
argues that Millikan’s theory entails that saliva ends up rep-
resenting food. Alex Morgan (2014) criticises William Ram-
sey’s (2007) account for entailing that the internal states of 
some plants are representations. And finally, Morgan (2018) 
accuses Tyler Burge’s account of representation (2010) for 
also applying to the same internal states of plants. 
The dilemma is this. A Naturalist can either accept or 
reject (bt*). If she accepts it, then she ends up committing 
to eliminativism about the mental. If she rejects it, then she 
has apparently taken only a small step towards naturalising 
the mental.
The first horn of the dilemma arises because, if (bt*) is 
true, then a fully naturalised account of representation must 
apply only to those states that are mental. This is just what 
(bt*) says in forging a link between the representational and 
the mental. But, if the sorts of complaints due to Sterelny, Mor-
gan and others about various Naturalist theories are correct, 
then the category of the mental turns out to be far broader than 
is plausible. Surely, this line of thought goes, no internal states 
6 Some philosophers also allege that there are counterexamples to the necessity of underived representational content to mentality. 
States like pains, fatigue, and generalised anxiety appear not to be about anything, yet are surely mental. I note this but will not consider 
it further here. See e.g. Crane (1998) for discussion.
7 For a representative example, Millikan characterises her project as “(…) a naturalist account of the specialness (or various kinds of 
specialness) of the mapping relation between a representation and its represented… an account that places this specialness in the realm 
of natural science, that is, of physics, physiology, biology, and evolutionary theory” (1984, p. 87).
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of plants (to take Morgan’s example) are really mental states. A 
Naturalist endorsing (bt*) must accept that, if their Naturalis-
tic theory is true, then the category of the mental just turns out 
to be much broader than we may have thought. 
But this is surely a form of eliminativism about the 
category of the mental. On our ordinary understanding of 
mentality, plants (and artefacts like thermometers, or natural 
phenomena like smoke8) just do not qualify. If the Natural-
ist disputes this (as they surely must if they hold (bt*) true 
and their account of representation applies to saliva, trees and 
so on), then this is a radical reimagining of what mentality 
is. And this is to admit the category of the mental is not the 
well-behaved one that we might have thought it to be. If a 
Naturalistic theory of representation like Millikan (1984) or 
Dretske (1981) is true, and (bt*) is true too, then it follows 
that mentality extends beyond what have traditionally been 
regarded as mental phenomena like perceptions, pains, beliefs 
and desires. A Naturalist might defend this reimagining of the 
category of the mental by questioning that there ever was a 
good reason to unify perceptions, pains etc. as exclusive to the 
mental domain in the first place. But this is precisely charac-
teristic of eliminativism about the mental. It is reminiscent of 
Richard Rorty’s eliminativist position: “The attempt to hitch 
pains and beliefs together seems ad hoc — they don’t seem 
to have anything in common except our refusal to call them 
‘physical’” (Rorty, 1979, p. 22). 
Further, we can note that such eliminativism carries a 
potential heavy cost. If our ordinary category of the men-
tal is thrown out by the Naturalist, then what is the subject 
matter of psychology? It is incumbent on the Naturalist to 
say something about what the sciences of the mind are doing 
if the category of the mental — redrawn Naturalistically — 
includes things previously regarded as obviously non-men-
tal. Tyler Burge raises essentially this criticism of (reductive) 
Naturalism. His main target is Millikan’s biosemantics, which 
tries to naturalise representation by reducing representation-
al function to biological function. Against this strategy, Burge 
argues that representation has a different explanatory role in 
psychology than biological function has in biology. The for-
mer, he thinks, must be given in terms of accuracy or veridi-
cality conditions, whereas biological function is understood in 
terms of pract ical success or failure. This is a “root mismatch” 
between “representational error and failure of biological func-
tion”, he thinks (Burge, 2010, p. 301) And it is this root mis-
match which explains why we have psychological explanation 
at all. We lose this if representational function gets reduced to 
biological function (Burge, 2010, p. 300ff).
One response the Naturalist might make is to highlight 
that she seeks to offer a revisionary theory of representation. 
Hence, that the theory applies to things we ordinarily regard 
as non-mental is a consequence we may expect. It is this re-
visionary nature that leads to the charge of eliminativism in 
the first place. And this revisionary project is entirely deliber-
ate. For example, Millikan’s self-stated core aim in her 1984 
is to develop a “general theory of signs” (1984, p. 12). Mental 
representations are but one manifest ation or application of 
this general theory. She intends to have her theory apply to 
a broad class of what she calls ‘intentional icons’ including: 
animal signals like bee dances and beaver tail slaps, linguis-
tic devices like imperatives and indexicals, as well as mental 
states like beliefs.
She is not alone. Fodor observed that theories (like 
Dretske’s) seeking to ground intentionality in information “might 
license the literal ascription of (underived) intentionality to ther-
mometers, thermostats, and the like” (Fodor, 1990, p. 130). But, 
he further noted: “I don’t think that should count as a reductio” 
(Fodor, 1990, p. 130). And Dretske is also explicit in early work: 
“intentionality, rather than being a ‘mark of the mental’, is a per-
vasive feature of all reality – mental and physical” (1994, p. 285).9
And later he declares “there is no need to naturalize intention-
ality. It is already a familiar part of our physical world” (1981, 
p. 471) Thus, the Naturalist may suggest, we ought to (as good 
scientists do) let our best theories guide our conception of the 
world. If our best theory of representation attributes content to 
states that we think of intuitively as non-mental, then so be it. It 
is rational to revise our intuitions.
But this response makes no headway against the objection 
of eliminativism. It merely serves to justify why eliminativism 
about the commonsense category of the mental may be war-
ranted in the light of Naturalistic theories of representation. 
Thus, it is not available to any Naturalist unhappy with elimi-
nativism. And, furthermore, we are still owed an explanation of 
what the subject matter of psychology might be. 
A stronger response the Naturalist can give is that the sorts 
of complaints that Sterelny, Allen and Hauser, and Morgan raise 
are fundamentally misguided for the following reason. In order 
to say that a Naturalist theory gets it wrong by telling us that 
plants have internal representations (where the having of inter-
nal representations is taken to indicate mentality via (bt*)) we 
need some independent grip on what things are really represen-
tations. Critics of Naturalism typically advance considerations 
from explanatory utility to show how smoke, tree rings, saliva, 
and Circadian clocks in plants fail to meet the requirements on 
being real representations. Indeed, William Ramsey’s Representa-
tion Reconsidered is largely an analysis of what sort of role a state 
must play in order to qualify as really representational.
The thought is grounded in a certain approach to mental 
representation derived from philosophy of science. Mental rep-
resentations, on this approach, are posits in theories that aim 
to explain behaviour and cognitive capacities.10 Crudely, repre-
8 Dretske (1981) is clear that these are intentional according to his informational semantics.
9 This remark would suggest that Dretske denies (bt*). I shall have more to say on this later.
10 Ramsey (2007) follows this strategy and attributes it originally to Stich (1983) and Cummins (1989). Shea (2018) is another adherent.
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sentations are posited to explain the sort of flexible behaviour 
seen only in relatively sophisticated minded creatures. We do 
not need to posit representations to explain, say, the lawful be-
haviour of iron filings in response to a magnetic field. But we do 
need them (let us suppose) to explain a human agent’s ability to 
(for example) plan out a walking route in advance. Hence, any 
theory that claims a certain state or system is representational 
must be mistaken if the explanation of ‘behaviour’ of that sys-
tem gains nothing by supposing that the state is a representa-
tion, or that the system is representational. 
A classic example is the magnetotact ic bact erium prom-
inently discussed in Dretske (1986). These water-dwelling 
bact eria have internal states that are responsive to magnetic 
fields. In their natural habitat, the bact eria move in response 
to the magnetic fields in the direction of oxygen-deficient 
water (which is beneficial for their survival). Both Dretske’s 
theory (1986) and Millikan (1989) attribute representational 
status to these internal states. But, one might argue, there is 
no explanatory benefit to thinking of these states as represen-
tational. A cause-effect explanation (like in the case of the 
iron filings) would do just as well. Hence, there is justification 
for resisting Naturalist theories based on their being overly 
liberal in attributing representational status. Representations 
are mere idle cogs in the explanation of salivary response, or 
the magnetotact ic bact eria, and other cases. 
So, a certain view on the explanatory role of represen-
tation must be presupposed in order to criticise Naturalistic 
theories for attributing representational status too liberally. 
But, Naturalists like Millikan in particular will argue that this 
presupposition is not allowed. The presupposition relies on an 
analysis of the notion of representation. And Naturalistic the-
ories like those of Millikan and Dretske try to give natural-
istically acceptable accounts of just that notion. But they do 
not try to give conceptual analyses of the notion. The account 
of ‘representation’ in Millikan, Dretske and others is some-
thing akin to a hypothesis developed to give a general expla-
nation of a diverse set of apparently similar phenomena. This 
is why Millikan aspires to give a ‘general theory of signs’. She 
sees the common factor of relation to a nonexistent content 
— as identified by Brentano in the realm of the mental —as 
present in other phenomena like language and animal com-
munication. She then attempts to give a unifying explanation 
of all of the diverse instances exhibiting this phenomenon. 
This is not a priori conceptual analysis. In fact, she strongly 
rejects this as a methodology. She puts things explicitly in lat-
er work, declaring that her intention is not conceptual anal-
ysis “(…) but rather of producing a notion that will organize 
certain natural phenomena for us in a way that casts light on 
the apparently paradoxical nature of intentionality” (Mil-
likan, 2000, p. 84-85). Thus, criticisms of Naturalism through 
the explanatory idleness of representations do not get off the 
ground according to the Naturalists themselves.
But this still does not escape the dilemma. The Natural-
ist approach just sketched allows them to undercut the accu-
sations of insufficiency from, for example, Morgan. But the 
deeper point remains: what becomes of mentality, the familiar 
category? The Naturalist has said nothing to assuage the charge 
of eliminativism yet. So, either they embrace eliminativism 
and face questions about what this means for psychology, or 
they must admit that, yes, they believe in mentality as such and 
must accept that the Naturalist account of representation so 
far seems not to have completely captured it.11
On the second of those last two options, the Naturalist 
may protest that a theory of representation could not — and 
was never intended to — be a theory of mentality. This is a 
reasonable line to take, and is endorsed by Naturalists such as 
Fodor (and Dretske (1988)), who sharply distinguishes a the-
ory of content from an account of the functional roles of men-
tal states. States with content, on Fodor’s view, are only mental
states when those states play the correct functional roles within 
the cognitive architecture of an organism (See, e.g. Fodor, 1987). 
But this seems to be effectively just a denial of (bt*) after all. 
This is because (bt*) identifies mentality with the possession 
of underived representational content, while the suggestion at 
hand is to add an additional condition to (bt*) sp ecifying the 
functional role a state with content must play. 
Of course, there is the option for the Naturalist to main-
tain (bt*) and attempt to add further naturalistically accept-
able conditions to rule out the consequence that apparently 
non-mental phenomena are representational. This response 
would, however, show that the Naturalist does indeed need to 
provide further theory in order to have naturalised the mental.
Of course, a Naturalist may decide that (bt*) is mistak-
en and fits only uncomfortably with the Naturalist project. 
This option has only limited appeal in the context of the di-
lemma, however. Brentano’s Thesis is attract ive because it of-
fers a mark of the mental: a way to separate the mental from 
the non-mental. As the Naturalist’s task is to naturalise the 
mind, it is essential to have some way to separate mental from 
non-mental phenomena. Otherwise eliminativism threatens 
again.12 But any Naturalist who wishes to resist eliminativism 
by denying (bt*) must thereby face the fact that they appar-
ently made little progress in naturalising the mind. 
While rejecting (bt*) may avoid eliminativism, it does 
so at the cost of abandoning a clear ‘mark of the mental’. 
And any philosopher wishing to avoid eliminativism must 
11 It is always, of course, open to the Naturalist to deny (BT*). This may in fact be the most sensible move for her.
12 Of course, some Naturalists will happily embrace this conclusion. William Ramsey is in fact an eliminativist, and his account of rep-
resentation applies to patently non-mental entities like plants (Ramsey, 2007, p. 230). Thus, if my analysis in this paper is correct, his 
naturalistic account of representation must either entail eliminativism if combined with (BT*) or (the other horn of the dilemma) it cannot 
be sufficient for naturalising the mind. Clearly, Ramsey can happily embrace eliminativism. Moreover, theorists like Millikan who are 
suspicious of conceptual analysis for independent reasons may also be untroubled by the conclusion that their theory of representation 
entails eliminating the category of the mental. If the category is too fuzzy to be useful, maybe we are better off without it.
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surely need some account of what distinguishes the men-
tal from the non-mental. It has generally been thought that, 
if there is a mark of the mental, Brentano’s Thesis gives us 
the best hope for that. Hence, a non-eliminativist Naturalist 
seeking to reject (bt*) must be prepared to give a natural-
istically promising alternative mark of the mental. And this 
constitutes an admission that Naturalism about the mind 
has much more to do. Further, this new mark of the mental 
must be one that will not simply succumb to the same prob-
lems of over-generalising that the naturalistic reduction of 
representation faced. For otherwise the charge of elimina-
tivism would also threaten again.
In this section I set out a dilemma for the Naturalist and 
considered what options the Naturalist has for getting out of 
it. Naturalist theories of representation broaden the notion 
of ‘representation’ as a key part of their reductive strategy to 
locate representation in the natural, physical world. Given 
this, Naturalist theories deem many intuitively non-represen-
tational phenomena representations. Thus, any Naturalist si-
multaneously affirming (bt*) seems to eliminate the category 
of the mental in the same stroke as they naturalised represen-
tation. Hence the Naturalist faces a choice: either embrace 
eliminativism, or accept that existing Naturalistic theories of 
representation are insufficient for naturalising mentality. The 
Naturalist does have a number of dialectical moves, such as 
rejecting conceptual analysis, and insisting that it is misguided 
to think that naturalising representation should ever natu-
ralise mentality. But I have argued that each of these moves 
is merely a short-term fix and fails to avoid the dilemma. If a 
Naturalist rejects (bt*), then they give up a plausible mark of 
the mental and with it a clear path to naturalising the men-
tal. Hence this suggests that the non-eliminativist Naturalist 
is in a difficult situation: either succumb to eliminativism, or 
accept that little progress has been made towards naturalising 
the mind. In the next section I will consider ways to dissolve 
the dilemma, and also suggest future directions for naturalis-
ing the mental.
4
I have been considering how the Naturalist may attempt 
to naturalise the mind. Brentano’s Thesis is an attract ive way 
to link representation and mentality, and a commonly ac-
cepted version of Brentano’s Thesis is (bt*). But Naturalist 
theories of representation find themselves in a dilemma when 
attempting to naturalise the mind. Is there a way for the Nat-
uralist to avoid this consequence?
There is, in fact, a questionable presupposition shared 
by both horns. Brentano’s original claims about intentionality 
are notoriously obscure. So, as I mentioned, equating Brenta-
no’s Thesis with (bt*) is a substantive claim. Thus, in order 
to dissolve the dilemma, one might reject the widespread as-
sumption that Brentanian intentionality simply is the posses-
sion of underived representational content. I explained how 
Millikan arrives at this interpretation. But her reasoning re-
lied on the claim that “(…) Brentano equated intentionality 
with the capacity to bear a real relation to something non-
existent” (Millikan, 2000, p. 83). This apparently interprets 
Brentano’s idea of ‘intentional inexistence’, and it is common-
place in the analytic tradition to understand Brentano as em-
phasising how thoughts can be about nonexistent things. But 
some Brentano interpreters contend that this is a misreading. 
Tim Crane, for example, says that “‘Inexistence’ expresses the 
idea that the object on which the mind is directed exists in the 
mental act itself ” (Crane, 1998, p. 232).13
So there is reason for pause on whether understanding 
Brentano’s ‘intentional relation’ as a relation to some possibly 
nonexistent object is correct. Thus (bt*) itself — formulat-
ed in terms of the underived representational content, and 
hence emphasising the semantic properties of mental repre-
sentations — may be a presupposition to be rejected. Crane 
(1998) suggests that a more historically accurate way to think 
about Brentanian intentionality is as sp ecifying that in every 
act something is given to the mind, in some sense (Crane, 
1998, p. 243). Whether this idea can be made sufficiently pre-
cise without arriving again at something like underived rep-
resentational content is a question for another paper.14 The 
suggestion just made amounts to this: the dilemma arises only 
because of a flawed and unworkable understanding of inten-
tionality as underived representational content. So, it may be 
that Brentano’s original observation cannot be captured by 
the dominant framework of conceiving of mental states as 
internal states with content.15
Another option that might dissolve the dilemma is to 
criticise the Naturalists for their particular brand of naturalism. 
As I mentioned, Naturalists attempt to reduce representation 
by giving a more ‘naturalistically acceptable’ account with no 
appeal to unreduced intentional, semantic or psychological no-
tions. They typically rely on the physical and biological sciences 
for this project. As Burge points out, philosophers in the natu-
ralising semantics tradition thus have a narrow and restrictive 
notion of what counts as a science (Burge, 2010, p. 296ff). In 
his view, it is mere dogma on the Naturalists’ part to refuse to 
acknowledge the psychological sciences as legitimate sciences. 
And if disciplines like perceptual psychology are mature and 
13 Moran (1996) makes a similar point. According to him, ‘inexistence’ simply refers to the Scholastic ontological notion of an accident 
inhering in a substance (Moran, 1996, p. 8).
14 It is also worth noting that Textor (2019) argues against understanding Brentano as offering a mark of the mental at all. Textor argues 
that Brentano intended his remarks to give “a piece of advice on how to become introspectively aware of the distinctive feature of 
mental phenomena” rather than offering an analytic definition of the mental (Textor, 2019).
15 Thanks to Dorit Bar-On for discussion on this point.
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successful sciences, then there is no reason to demand that in-
tentional or semantic notions like representation be reduced to 
physical or biological ones. Burge uses this strategy of broad-
ening what naturalism is to say that representations are them-
selves primitive explanatory kinds (2010, p. 63). Broadening 
naturalism in this way thus opens the possibility of maintaining 
(bt*) while naturalising representation, without eliminating 
the category of the mental.16
So far I have considered two options for dissolving the 
dilemma. The first suggestion was that we might attempt to 
formulate Brentano’s Thesis in different terms than (bt*). 
The second suggestion was to broaden ‘naturalism’ to in-
clude the psychological sciences, and therefore discharge 
naturalism from the task of having to find a non-intentional, 
non-psychological, non-semantic account of representation. 
Of course, the dilemma facing Naturalists is not fatal. Some 
Naturalists will happily grasp the eliminativist horn. And the 
other horn simply requires additional theoretical work. To 
close this paper, I will outline what this work might consist in.
It may be that separating mental states from non-men-
tal states requires still further conditions beyond the mere 
possession of underived representational content. If this is 
so, then there will be states that are properly representations, 
and have a particular representational content, yet that are 
non-mental. But this need not commit us to denying that 
there is any real category of the mental so long as the further 
condition proposed is not susceptible to over-generalising. 
One attract ive general suggestion for what this initial condi-
tion could be is that it should reference how a representation-
al state with a particular content is used in a certain system. 
Only states that are used in the appropriate way by certain 
systems would then qualify as mental states.
Ramsey (2007) discusses this issue at length and propos-
es a ‘use’ condition to bridge the gap between a state’s merely 
having a certain representational content and a state’s being 
used in virtue of that content. This is also one of the driving 
principles in Dretske (1988). He writes: “The fact that [con-
tent-possessing mental states] have a content, the fact that 
they have a semantic charact er, must be relevant to the kind of 
effects they produce” (Dretske, 1988, p. 80) Both Dretske and 
Ramsey hold that a state with representational content must 
play a particular causal role internal to the system of which it 
is a part in order to count as a mental representation.17 Ram-
sey’s use condition derives from the ‘mental models’ concep-
tion of mental representations found in Craik (1943), and de-
veloped by Swoyer (1991). In brief, the idea is that a system’s 
internal state functions as a mental representation if that 
state is used as a surrogate or stand-in for what it represents.
However, any use condition like Ramsey’s mental mod-
el conception must also be able to avoid a fatal ‘homunculus’ 
regress. A Naturalistic account of how the system uses a rep-
resentational state as a representation of such-and-such can-
not invoke any notions like ‘understanding’, ‘taking’ or ‘seeing 
that’. If it did, then the explanation of the use condition would 
seem to require positing further internal representational 
states to explain how a system could ‘understand’ or ‘take’ 
a certain representational state as being a representation of 
such-and-such. Consequently, an infinite regress of represen-
tations appears to loom.18
To address this worry, Ramsey proposes a mechanistic 
account of how representations get used as surrogates by 
purely causal-physical systems. The key point is that caus-
al-physical systems are, by definition, mindless. The threat 
of regress arises because it is notoriously difficult to say how 
a system could use a representation as a representation in 
virtue of its having a particular content without invoking 
further representations in an ‘interpreting’ system (Ramsey, 
2007, p. 193-203). Hence, a purely mechanistic account of 
the use condition (if successful) would succeed in avoiding 
the regress because mechanistic explanations, by definition, 
do not make reference to any minds or interpreters.19 Unfor-
tunately, this appears to face the very same kind of over-gen-
eralisation problem that dogged the original Naturalists in the 
naturalised semantics tradition. Morgan (2014) argues that 
Ramsey still has not succeeded in fully naturalising mental 
representation because Circadian clocks in plants apparently 
make use of representations in Ramsey’s sense. Hence Ram-
sey’s account threatens to apply too broadly and so veers to-
wards eliminativism (though this is a consequence Ramsey is 
content with). 
What is missing is some requirement to exclude obvi-
ously non-mental causal-physical systems from having states 
that qualify as representations by the use condition.20 This is 
analogous to the problem Naturalistic theories of content face 
in applying too broadly because they explain having content 
in terms of a purely Naturalistic relation a state stands in to 
16 Morgan (2018) argues that Burge’s account of representation actually fails on this front because it attributes representational states 
to Circadian clocks in plants. I cannot evaluate Morgan’s argument here. But his paper suggests that even a broadened understanding 
of naturalism may have some work to do to avoid the dilemma I have highlighted. If a naturalist account of representation (in the new, 
broader sense of naturalism) still attributes representational status to apparently non-mental states, then this new account is as suscep-
tible to the charge of eliminativism as any of those from the naturalised semantics tradition.
17 See also Morgan (2014, p. 228ff) for discussion.
18 For attempts to show how this regress is not vicious, see Dennett (1978) and Lycan (1987).
19 See Morgan (2014) for criticism of Ramsey on this point.
20 Morgan puts this general point like this in his 2018: “[S]ophisticated tracking theories [like those of Dretske, Millikan etc.] flesh out 
what it means for an informational state to be ‘internal’ by appealing to the distinctive ways in which those states are enlisted and used 
within a system such that a robust notion of accuracy finds purchase, but that this doesn’t guarantee that informational states are inte-
grated within the distinctive capacities of psychological systems” (2018, p. 5425).
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what it represents. Ramsey faces over-generalisation because 
the use condition is given in strictly Naturalistic, mechanistic 
terms. The alternative is for the Naturalist to find another ac-
count of the use condition that is adequate to the task. Hence, 
we have again a stark choice for the Naturalist between elim-
inativism and the prosp ect that there is significant theoretical 
work still required to naturalise the mental.
Let me make some suggestive preliminary remarks 
about where to go next. The thought that a state may be 
a representation and have a determinate representational 
content without being a mental state suggests that we can 
distinguish between two kinds of internal states: conscious-
ly accessible, personal-level states and subpersonal states 
that are not consciously accessible.21 Once this is noted, it 
suggests that the problem of demarcating the mental is in 
the vicinity of the issue of distinguishing between person-
al and subpersonal states.22 And personal states are those 
that are consciously accessible to a subject, and hence can 
contribute to a subject’s first-person perspective. Thus, one 
potential route forward might be to focus on what condi-
tions a state would have to meet to be used in contributing 
to this perspective.23 This is to recognise the importance of 
the subject in naturalising representation. But how exactly 
this may fit with any kind of naturalism about the mind is 
clearly a deep and difficult issue.24
5
I have argued that a dilemma arises for Naturalists at-
tempting to naturalise the mind. If a Naturalist accepts (bt*) 
as a version of Brentano’s Thesis, then they appear to commit 
to an eliminativism about the category of the mental. This is 
because (bt*) is the thesis that having underived represen-
tational content is necessary and sufficient for a state’s being 
mental. But Naturalistic theories of representation are reduc-
tive, and so over-generalise by applying to patently non-men-
tal states. Only proposing further Naturalistic conditions on 
representation could avoid the eliminativist conclusion. But 
this shows that Naturalists have made only limited progress 
towards naturalising the mental. And if a Naturalist rejects 
(bt*), then she gives up on a clear link between representa-
tion and mentality. Hence, it is incumbent on the Naturalist 
to propose another, naturalistically acceptable, mark of the 
mental. This, again, shows that Naturalists have made only 
limited progress on the issue of naturalising the mind.
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